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Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides the first econometric analysis of problem banks in Germany. 
Drawing on an original dataset of distressed co-operative and savings banks, we 
develop early warning indicators for banking difficulties using a parametric approach. 
Taking the idiosyncratic characteristics of the German banking sector into account 
and controlling for microeconomic variables, we evaluate as to whether bank type and 
location matter. Findings indicate that banks in West Germany are less risky than 
credit institutions in the Neue Länder and that co-operatives are more prone to 
experience financial difficulties than savings banks. We conclude that a model that 
combines both savings and co-operative banks is sufficient to identify problem 
institutions up to three years prior to the surfacing of distress.   
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1. Introduction 
The identification of problem banks using econometric models has been a key subject 
of research over the past few decades. The need for such models, also termed early 
warning systems or off-site surveillance systems, stems from the fact that the 
information content of bank ratings obtained in on-site examinations can be rendered 
insignificant in a short time span (Cole and Gunther, 1988). Bank supervisors 
therefore supplement their on-site examinations with off-site surveillance systems for 
the identification of problem banks. These models are developed to discriminate 
between sound and unsound institutions such that bank supervisors can allocate scarce 
resources in an efficient manner. Moreover, early warning systems help to mitigate 
the cost imposed on society by bank failures and restrain supervisory forbearance as 
they enable prompt corrective action where financial difficulties are detected.  
The seminal paper by Meyer and Pifer (1970) on impaired U.S. banks utilises a 
qualitative response model. Subsequent work by Sinkey (1975), Santomero and Visno 
(1977) and Altman (1977) also focuses on the U.S. banking market and draws mainly 
on discriminant analysis for the classification of banks. Martin (1977) and West 
(1985) employ logit regression analysis for the identification of unsound institutions 
whereas Lane et al. (1986) pioneered the field by using duration analysis. Further 
econometric studies of early warning systems for the U.S. based on logit regression 
analysis, duration analysis and trait recognition can be found in Espahbodi (1991), 
Thomsen (1991), Whalen (1991), Cole et al., (1995), Estrella et al., (2000), Kolari et 
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al., (2002), Gunther and Moore (2003) and Collier et al., (2003). Demirgüç-Kunt 
(1989) provides an in-depth assessment of the early studies. Research on other 
banking markets’ experiences with problem banks is less widespread. Episodes of 
banking turmoil in Spain in the late 1970s and 1980s sparked off the development of 
early warning models by Laffarga Briones et al. (1988) and Rodriguez (1989). 
Leading indicators for problem banks in Norway are developed by Berg and 
Hexeberg (1994). Laviola et al. (1999) examine the period of banking difficulties in 
Italy in the 1990s and Logan (2000) provides an overview on leading indicators for 
the U.K. small banks crisis in the early 1990s. Problem institutions in South East Asia 
in the late 1990s are investigated by Bongini et al. (2001). However, in spite of the 
fact that the German banking sector has been experiencing severe strain recently, to 
our best knowledge no empirical analysis exists to date due to severe sampling 
limitations. 
Three out of four large German private commercial banks suffered major losses in 
2002 and a number of small and medium sized institutions had to be merged, closed 
by the regulator or had to be rescued by lifeboat operations over the past six years due 
to serious difficulties (IMF, 2003; Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen1 
(BAKred), 2001, 2000, 1999). Savings banks and co-operative banks increasingly 
engage in merger activities attributable to economic problems and due to excess 
concentration within the same municipality. Figures by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2000, 2004a) indicate that the total number of savings banks decreased by 17 percent 
between 1998 and 2003 and that the number of co-operative banks fell by 38 percent 
respectively. Finally, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), 
(2004, 2003, 2002) and the BAKred (2001, 1998) repeatedly report that a rising 
number of co-operative banks have received indemnities and cash injections by the 
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institution protection scheme operated by the Federal Association of Co-operative 
Banks over the past few years, thereby stretching the resources of the protection 
scheme significantly.  
[TABLE 1] 
Table 1 provides an overview on the composition of the German banking sector by 
pillar. The German banking system with its approximately 2,300 financial institutions 
is highly idiosyncratic in six distinct ways. First, the universal banking system 
consists of the three pillars of private commercial, savings and co-operative banks 
which are all different in terms of objectives and ownership structure (Brunner et al., 
2004). Second, Schmidt and Tyrell (2004) point out that banks in Germany play a 
more significant role in the intermediation of funds than in Anglo-Saxon economies. 
Third, Hackethal (2004) exposits that more than 80 percent of licensed institutions are 
either savings or co-operative banks. These banks are therefore not strictly profit 
maximising enterprises as they serve the public interests of their region and their 
members respectively. Fourth, savings and co-operative banks operate on a regional 
basis that constrains business activities to their municipality or district. This precludes 
competition within the respective pillar (Hackethal, 2004). Fifth, the level of deposit 
insurance coverage is unusually high by international standards. For co-operatives and 
savings banks, not only deposits but also the institutions themselves are protected by 
institution protection schemes operated by the Federal Association of Co-operative 
Banks and by the German Savings Bank Association (Brunner et al., 2004; IMF, 
2003). Finally, the German financial system is perceived to be a prime example for 
particularly close ties and extensive relations between corporate borrowers and their 
banks. This information-sensitive and long term-relationship is commonly referred to 
as the Hausbank Financing Principle (Elsas and Krahnen, 2004).  
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The urgent need to devise an off-site surveillance system for banking problems in 
Germany as identified by the IMF (2003) and the current absence of studies focusing 
on financial difficulties in co-operative credit institutions and savings banks provide 
the key rationale for investigating problem institutions in these two pillars. These 
groups of institutions together account for more than 48 percent of total assets in the 
German banking industry.2 Moreover, the savings bank sector is expected to 
experience further strain in the future because of the phasing out of public guarantees 
of its liabilities in 2005 (Brunner et al., 2004). As savings banks are currently 
perceived to gain competitive advantages from these guarantees in terms of lower 
funding costs, the phasing out is likely to decrease these banks’ profitability because 
of the anticipated rise in funding costs. 
The idiosyncratic structure of the banking system provides an appropriate setting to 
advance the literature on leading indicators of bank fragility in a variety of ways. 
First, drawing on an original database of problem institutions across savings and co-
operative banks over the period 1999 - 2002, we explore the question as to whether 
the classification as a problem bank is related to the type of institution. Second, we 
investigate whether the Hausbank Financing Principle impacts upon the importance of 
credit risk as leading indicator. Third, the observation that many German institutions 
are unusually small in size by international standards (Brunner et al., 2004), suggests 
testing whether or not bank size impacts upon the probability of being classified as a 
problem institution. Finally, the fact that there still exist marked differences in the 
economic environment between West Germany and the Neue Länder lends itself to an 
analysis of the question as to whether bank location matters.  
In contrast to a widely held view that German accounting principles are fairly 
“uninformative” (Leuz and Wüstemann, 2004), our findings indicate that publicly 
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available financial statement data and institutional variables can effectively help 
classify problem banks across the two types of institutions. The incorporation of 
variables that capture bank type and location is found to significantly augment the 
explanatory power of our model. Despite the close relationships between banks and 
borrowers, poor asset quality is discovered to be a main contributor to German 
banking problems. Based on our validation exercise, we conclude that leading 
indicators of banking problems in Germany can be effectively developed using 
publicly available financial statement data and institutional variables.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the definition of problem 
banks and provides an overview on the parametric approach, the dataset and the 
independent variables. Section 3 reports the empirical results. Section 4 exposits the 
findings from the validation exercise and Section 5 concludes and offers avenues for 
future research. 
 
2. Parametric Model, Sample Composition and Independent Variables 
2.1 Definition of the Term “Problem Bank” 
Our definition takes into account the idiosyncratic structure of the German banking 
sector. The German Savings Bank Association and the Federal Association of Co-
operative Banks pursue a “quiet” approach such that problems rarely surface in the 
public domain (IMF, 2003). Ailing savings banks often receive indemnities to remain 
in business rather than exit the market. In addition, they may be merged with a 
stronger savings bank. The costs of restructuring the impaired institution are 
frequently shared between the owner of the troubled bank, the maintenance obligator 
(Anstaltsträger), and the institution protection scheme. Impaired co-operative credit 
institutions similarly receive indemnities and cash injections from the institution 
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protection scheme operated by the Federal Association of Co-operative Banks to 
remain in business independently. Likewise, they may be merged with a stronger co-
operative bank. This approach of treating ailing savings and co-operative institutions 
is however highly debatable. Kane (1989) refers to those institutions that remain in 
business independently as “zombie” institutions as these banks can still provide 
banking services to the public even though they are no longer viable from an 
economic point of view. The fact that the bank resolution strategies adopted by the 
German Savings Bank Association and by the Federal Association of Co-operative 
Banks are closely aligned with each other suggests developing a leading indicator 
model of bank fragility that embraces the two pillars. Moreover, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2004b) comments that the private commercial banks are too 
heterogeneous a group to be included in an early warning system for the identification 
of problem banks. We therefore concentrate on co-operative and savings banks in this 
study. A savings or co-operative bank is classified as a problem institution at that 
point in time when it first seeks assistance from its protection scheme. This is an 
unambiguous definition and is similar to definitions employed in previous studies 
(Berg and Hexeberg, 1994).  
2.2 Sample Composition 
Sampling limitations have thus far impeded the analysis of problem banks in 
Germany as neither the Deutsche Bundesbank nor the BaFin provide details on 
problem banks or grant public access to their proprietary databases. We draw on an 
original database for problem banks compiled by the German Auditor’s Chamber that 
contains information on qualified and amended certification annotations in annual 
reports. German auditors have to certify company accounts on an annual basis to 
assess as to whether the accounts provide a true and fair view of the financial 
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condition of the institution. Whereas the auditors certify sound institutions’ accounts 
with an unqualified certification notation, a qualified or amended certification 
notation is applied for problem institutions.3 A certification notation has to be 
qualified or amended whenever a bank receives external support from the respective 
institution protection scheme. The certification notation explicitly spells out the form 
of assistance provided to the banks. For example, indemnities, cash injections or other 
types of capital restoration measures received by the problem bank result in a 
qualified or amended certification notation of the bank’s annual report.   
We focus on the period between 1999 and 2002 as a large number of financial 
institutions across the savings and the co-operative banking sector sought support 
from the respective institution protection scheme. Our sample consists of 615 co-
operative credit institutions and savings banks of which 96 banks received support 
from their institution protection scheme. Whilst this sample size is still small in 
comparison to studies focussing on the U.S. banking market, it is large by 
international standards. Furthermore, the number of problem institutions exceeds that 
of problem banks reported in many of the empirical studies on other jurisdictions 
reviewed in Section 1 of this paper. In terms of the number of institutions, our dataset 
covers more than 31 percent of licensed co-operative and savings banks in Germany 
and more than 44 percent of total assets held by these groups of institutions.  
A small number of co-operative credit institutions received multiple indemnities over 
consecutive years that backtrack before our observation period. Additionally, some of 
the impaired co-operatives were merged with healthy institutions, and subsequently 
became a problem institution and were merged yet again. One savings bank received 
an indemnity, was merged with a sound savings bank and the merged entity received 
additional indemnities afterwards. As it is not possible to determine a problem date 
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for these nine banks, they had to be dropped from the original sample. Moreover, no 
data on independent variables could be obtained for a further six problem institutions 
such that overall 15 institutions had to be deleted from the dataset. The final sample 
therefore contains 81 problem banks.  
We have carefully selected 519 sound banks as a control group. These institutions are 
a random drawing that represents savings and co-operative banks. As it is a common 
approach to merge problem banks with healthy ones, the condition was imposed that 
the sound institutions did not engage in any merger activity over the observation 
period in order to prevent sampling distortions.  
Robustness tests are carried out by holding back 100 banks of which 17 are problem 
institutions. Table 2 provides an overview of sample composition by pillar.  
[TABLE 2] 
2.3 Parametric Model 
We use a cross-sectional model in this study to identify the key risk drivers that 
underlie an institution being classified as a problem bank. Consequently, we draw 
upon financial statement data and institutional variables as at year end 1998 to predict 
impairment in the succeeding three years in our training sample. As we decide against 
estimating a model for panel data, we rule out the possibility that our estimates are 
influenced by exogenous factors. Bongini et al. (2001) highlight that aspects such as 
changing supervisory behaviour over the years in the classification of problem banks 
or macroeconomic fluctuations could impact the inferences drawn.  
We employ a parametric approach using logistic distribution as it enables the 
modelling of binary outcomes. This methodological approach is considered to be 
superior to other techniques such as multiple discriminant analysis as it establishes a 
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causal relationship between bank characteristics and subsequent problem status 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989). Moreover, it does not require multivariate normality among 
the predictor variables (Kolari et al., 2002). The model underlies a latent variable 
model of the form 
}{ ( )β,1 iii xGxyP == .       (1) 
The function ( ).G  implies that the probability for observing a problem bank 1=iy  is 
described by a vector of independent variables ix . In order to obtain a binary 
outcome, the function ( ).G  has to lie in the interval [ ]1,0  only. This can be achieved 
by using a distribution function such as the standard logistic function which gives rise 
to the logit model 
( ) w
w
e
ewL += 1          (2) 
where w  is an index that combines the independent variables of the form 
kk XXXw βββα ++++= ...2211       (3) 
where α  is the intercept and kβββ ,...,, 21  are the regression coefficients for the 
independent variables kXXX ,...,, 21 . The parameters of the model can be estimated 
using maximum likelihood estimation technique.    
 
2.4 Independent Variables 
Previous studies draw upon commonly employed CAMEL4-type variables as 
predictors for the identification of problem institutions. In addition, market data are 
incorporated as well into these studies to augment the explanatory power of these 
models. As neither equity nor debt securities of co-operatives and savings banks are 
publicly traded, this kind of information cannot be utilised in a study on Germany. 
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However, the German banking sector with its idiosyncratic characteristics provides an 
appropriate setting to test for numerous other hypotheses. Thus, rather than applying 
proxies for the CAMEL categories or including market data, we use a different set of 
independent variables. The structure of the banking system with different types of 
institutions that are characterised by different exposures to risk in the presence of 
information asymmetries and agency conflicts between debtholders, depositors, 
shareholders, managers and banking associations that wield an influential role in the 
bank resolution process, lends itself to testing the hypothesis as to whether the 
potential of being a problem bank is related to the bank type. We therefore fit a 
dummy variable (X12) that captures bank type. Controlling for capital holdings (X1), 
loan growth (X2) and loan loss provisions (X3), we also fit a dummy variable (X11) that 
proxies bank location as the economic setting between East and West Germany still 
differs markedly. Poor management is considered a particular problem in co-operative 
banks. The BaFin (2003) reports that 88 percent of all formal actions taken by the 
supervisory agency against senior executives are aimed at co-operative institutions. 
This necessitates a proxy for management quality (X4). We assume that management 
quality is reflected in asset quality, proxied by loan loss provisioning, and excessive 
loan growth. An interaction term of these two variables is therefore employed. Even if 
an institution experiences strong loan growth, we expect prudent bank managers to 
consequently increase provisions for bad debt. Financial performance of the 
institutions is captured by a proxy for operating profits. The recurring earning power 
(X5) is a measure of profit before tax prior to deducting loan loss provisions. Cost-
efficiency is reflected in the cost-income ratio (X6). Liquidity is proxied by a variable 
expressing liquid assets as proportion of customer and short term funding (X7). In 
order to gauge the exposure to sudden deposit withdrawals by institutional depositors, 
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we include a predictor for deposits held by banks (X8). Brunner et al. (2004) contend 
that German institutions insufficiently diversify their revenue streams. We test 
revenue diversification by fitting a variable that captures interest income to total 
income (X9). Finally, we empirically assess whether bank size matters (X10). Contrary 
to previous studies, this is not to be understood as an examination of the adaptation of 
the “too big to fail” doctrine (Kaufman, 2002) in Germany as large private 
commercial banks, Landesbanken and the large apex institutions of the co-operative 
banks that would be deemed “too big to fail” are excluded from our study. The BaFin 
(2003), and the BAKred (2001) repeatedly state that management quality, particularly 
in small co-operative banks, is subject to close scrutiny as a number of the proposed 
mergers experience serious delays due to the absence of adequately qualified senior 
executives that meet the requirements laid out for senior bank managers by the 
German Bank Act (2004). It can be inferred therefore that small institutions may be 
more prone to experience difficulties due to the absence of sophisticated management 
procedures and principles. An overview of the independent variables and the expected 
sign of the respective coefficient is given in Table 5. Annual data for the independent 
variables are obtained from Bankscope, a commercial database for financial 
institutions maintained by Bureau van Dijk.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Univariate Tests 
There is a strong case for specifying one model that identifies problem banks in both 
the co-operative and savings bank sectors. First, the institutions in these two pillars 
are unusually small in size by international standards (Brunner et al., 2004). Second, 
their banking activities are locally constraint to the immediate municipality or district. 
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Third, the bank resolution strategies adopted by the respective institution protection 
schemes of the two groups are widely comparable. Whilst the two groups of 
institutions are markedly different in terms of their ownership structure, their lines of 
business are practically indistinguishable. Nonetheless, we perform an econometric 
analysis where we test against the null hypothesis of equal means of our independent 
variables between the two groups of banks.  
Table 3 presents the results of our univariate test. In order to permit comparison of the 
full set of problem banks with sound institutions, data for 1998 are exploited for this 
univariate analysis. Contrary to the previously outlined commonalities of co-
operatives and savings banks, all our independent variables exhibit statistically 
significant differences between the two types of institutions. Whilst the covariates for 
loan loss provisions (X3) and management quality (X4) only border on the 90 percent 
confidence level, all the other variables are significantly different between co-
operatives and savings banks at the 95 or 99 percent confidence levels. We find that 
credit co-operatives are higher capitalised (X1), experience stronger loan growth (X2), 
provision more for non-performing loans (X3), exhibit weaker recurring earning power 
(X5), are less cost-efficient (X6), show lower liquidity levels (X7), receive less deposits 
from other institutions (X8) and have a lower dependency on interest income (X9). 
They are also smaller in size (X10). Thus, contrary to the qualitative comparison of 
savings banks and co-operatives, our econometric examination of the dataset suggests 
marked differences between these types of institutions. Consequently, we estimated 
parametric models for each pillar individually to evaluate leading indicators for 
problem banks. However, the findings of these tests did not satisfactorily approximate 
the dataset for savings banks. This can be explained by the considerably lower 
frequency of distressed savings banks. In light of this, we do not report these results 
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here and conclude that a model that embraces the two groups of institutions 
simultaneously is superior for the identification of leading indicators of problem 
banks.5 The subsequent exposition concentrates on a model based on our full dataset.  
[TABLE 3] 
We run a further univariate test and evaluate whether the means of the independent 
variables between sound banks and institutions that became problem banks in the 
period between 1999 and 2001 are significantly different from each other. This 
analysis is also based on independent variables for the year 1998 for both groups of 
institutions. The data for 2002 are held back for the validation exercise (see Section 
4). As depicted in Table 4, mean values of six variables for the sound versus problem 
institutions are significantly different at the 95 and 99 percent confidence levels 
respectively. Sound banks provision less for impaired loans (X3), exhibit higher 
operating profitability (X5), are significantly more cost efficient (X6) and are more 
liquid (X7) than problem banks. Interest income in problem institutions is more 
important than in healthy banks (X9) and these institutions are also discovered to be 
significantly smaller than sound banks (X10).  
 [TABLE 4] 
3.2 Multivariate Tests 
In order to assess leading indicators for problem banks, we estimate parametric 
models for the dataset comprising savings and co-operative banks based on 
independent variables for 1998. Table 5 illustrates the results for two different 
specifications. In Specification I, we estimate a canonical model that contains 
exclusively financial statement data. We force all independent variables to enter the 
equation in Specification II to analyse as to whether the incorporation of dummy 
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variables that capture bank location and bank type augment the explanatory power of 
the model.  
 [TABLE 5]   
The results presented in Table 5 for Specification I illustrate that six out of the ten 
independent variables are significantly different from zero. Loan growth (X2), loan 
loss provisions (X3), management quality (X4), cost-income ratio (X6) and the proxy 
for liquidity mismatch (X7) are significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels and show the 
expected sign for the respective coefficient. Accelerating loan growth and increased 
loan loss provisioning as well as cost inefficiencies in the period up to three years 
prior to being classified as problem bank increase the probability of distress. By 
contrast, high quality management and high levels of liquidity significantly contribute 
to decreasing the probability of future problems. The variable that captures bank size 
(X10) is also correctly signed and borders on statistical significance at the 10 percent 
level. This confirms our hypothesis that larger banks are less risky than smaller 
institutions. The covariates that proxy capital holdings (X1) and recurring earning 
power (X5) exhibit counterintuitive signs and are not statistically significant. The 
proxy for revenue diversification (X9) is insignificant and shows a negative sign, 
indicating that increasing dependency on interest income decreases the probability for 
future distress. The measure for the exposure to sudden deposit withdrawals (X8) is 
correctly signed but insignificant. This finding underlines the influence that the 
institution protection schemes have on lowering the propensity for bank runs by 
institutions in Germany.  
Closer examination of Specification II suggests that the incorporation of additional 
variables that proxy bank location and bank type considerably augments the 
explanatory power of the model. The higher McFadden R2 indicates a better fit of 
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Specification II for our dataset. The superiority of Specification II is reinforced by the 
lower value of the Akaike Information Criterion, reported in Table 5. Eight of the 
twelve covariates exhibit statistical significance and all these variables show the 
anticipated sign. Loan loss provisions (X3), management quality (X4), operating 
profitability (X5) and the cost-income ratio (X6) are highly statistically significant at 
the 99 percent confidence level.  The proxy for liquidity (X7) is significantly different 
from zero as well, albeit at the 95 percent confidence level whereas the significance 
level for loan growth (X2) declines to 90 percent in Specification II. Our analysis also 
presents evidence at the 99 percent confidence level that banks in West Germany are 
less likely to run into difficulties than credit institutions in the Neue Länder (X11). This 
does not come as a surprise. Banks in East Germany operate in an adverse economic 
environment with considerably higher rates of unemployment than in West Germany. 
Whilst major improvements in managerial skills have been taking place in the Neue 
Länder over the past 15 years, the risk associated with credit institutions in East 
Germany is still considerably greater than in West Germany. The variable that 
captures bank type (X12) is negatively signed at the 99 percent confidence level. This 
suggests that savings banks are less risky than co-operatives. Our empirical evidence 
is corroborated by repeated statements by German banking supervisors regarding the 
serious difficulties experienced in the co-operative banking sector. This is also 
substantiated by the higher frequency of observed distresses as illustrated in Table 2. 
The predictors that capture capital holdings (X1) and deposits held by banks (X8) are 
correctly signed but remain insignificant. Increases in interest income decrease the 
probability for future problems whereas the size variable (X10) is now positively 
signed; suggesting increasing bank size increases the probability for impairment.  
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4. Robustness Tests 
The validation exercise utilises financial statement data for 100 co-operative and 
savings banks of which 17 sought support from the respective institution protection 
scheme in 2002. Table 2 provides an overview of the composition of the holdout 
sample. In light of our finding that the incorporation of dummy variables that capture 
bank type and location substantially augments the explanatory power of the model, we 
re-estimate Specification II employing only the eight statistically significant variables. 
The equation for the robustness test is reported in the Notes to Table 6. We perform 
three robustness tests in this section. In order to assess the actual classification 
accuracy of the proposed set of leading indicators for the identification of problem 
banks, the analyses are based on independent variables as at year end 1999, 2000 and 
2001 to identify problem institutions in 2002. This approach assumes stable 
characteristics of problem banks over time. Deterioration in the model’s predictive 
power over a number of years would suggest an unstable relationship between bank 
characteristics and subsequent impairment.   
The evaluation of the predictive power of the model should not concentrate on the 
overall classification accuracy. Previous studies widely neglect the finding by 
Korobow and Stuhr (1985) that substantial differences in the sampling size of the 
groups of problem banks and sound institutions could give rise to misleading 
inferences when focussing on the overall classification accuracy. Whilst overall 
classification accuracy close to 100 percent can be obtained in such a case, only a 
small proportion of the crucial group of problem banks is identified in this setting. A 
more informative approach to gauge the predictive power was initially proposed by 
Lloyd-Ellis et al. (1990) and subsequently reiterated by authors at the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the U.S. (Collier et al., 2003). Observing the trade 
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off between Type I and Type II Errors at different critical levels helps to assess the 
model’s predictive power. Furthermore, the opportunity costs associated with each 
type of error have to be taken into consideration. A Type I Error is observed when a 
problem institution is flagged up as sound, whereas a Type II Error denotes the 
misclassification of a sound institution as a problem bank. Ignoring the opportunity 
costs associated with each type of error and simply maximising total classification 
accuracy has wide ranging ramifications for society. For instance, the 
misclassification of problem institutions can, in the worst case, impose negative 
externalities on society. If large institutions experience severe difficulties, it may 
happen, that the institution protection schemes have insufficient resources to 
recapitalise the banks and ultimately tax payer’s money would have to be utilised. On 
the contrary, the opportunity costs associated with Type II Errors are far less 
substantial. Misclassifying sound banks suggests that the institutions are put under 
close scrutiny by the supervisory agency and subject to on-site audits. The supervisory 
agency thus bears the opportunity cost for Type II Errors. The opportunity costs of 
making a Type I Error undoubtedly outweigh the opportunity costs of Type II Errors. 
Therefore, the results for the robustness test in Table 6 shows the respective Type I 
and Type II Errors in light of a range of different critical levels based on independent 
variables as at year end 1999, 2000 and 2001. These cut-off points constitute the level 
of making a Type I Error. For instance, a critical level of 10 percent underlies a 
confidence level of 90 percent not to make a Type I Error.  
[TABLE 6] 
Table 6 illustrates the results for the three robustness tests in light of different critical 
levels. As outlined previously, it is essential to reduce Type I Errors to mitigate the 
risk of missing a problem bank. Therefore, we set a confidence level of at least 90 
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percent to avoid making a Type I Error. Utilising independent variables as at 1999, 
that is three years prior to seeking support from the institution protection schemes, the 
risk for making a Type I Error approaches 56 percent, whilst the level for Type II 
Error is fairly low at 16 percent. However, increasing the confidence level to 95 
percent reveals that the risk of misclassifying a distressed institution declines sharply 
to 31 percent whereas the level of Type II Error remains acceptably low at 32 percent. 
Allowing for this higher confidence level, and assuming the proposition that stable 
relationships between bank characteristics and subsequent distress hold, the reported 
predictive power for three years prior to becoming a problem institution compares 
favourably with previous studies of banking distress. For example, our classification 
accuracy in the validation exercise outperforms Logan’s (2000) model that aims to 
identify problems in small institutions in the U.K.  
The potential of failing to correctly identify a problem bank based on the independent 
variables for the year 2000 moves towards 29 percent at a critical level of 10 percent 
whereas the risk for misclassifying a healthy co-operative or savings bank increases to 
42 percent.  
At a critical level of 10 percent, the risk for misclassifying a problem bank declines to 
25 percent in 2001 (the year immediately prior to distress). By contrast, the level of 
Type II Error rises to 48 percent, suggesting that nearly one half of the sound banks in 
our holdout sample are classified as problem institutions. This may be due to a 
substantial rise in the mean of the probabilities of being classified as problem 
institution over the period 1999 to 2001 as portrayed in Table 6. The mean for the 
probability of distress rises from less than 12 percent in 1999 to more than 26 percent 
in 2001 in the holdout sample. This figure does not necessarily imply that 26 percent 
of the institutions under consideration will eventually experience difficulties. Instead, 
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it strongly suggests the presence of exogenous factors that affect the entire banking 
system in a similar manner and spotlights a deteriorating soundness of the banking 
system. The observation of increased fragility in the German banking system is 
confirmed, at least partially, by the IMF’s (2003) statement that numerous institutions, 
even large banks, reported sizeable losses in 2002. Likewise, the German supervisory 
agency reports that a rising number of bank insolvencies figured in the public domain 
in 2001 and that the institution protection scheme administered by the Federal 
Association of Co-operative Banks decided upon increasing the premiums for its 
member institutions from 2003 onwards in order to shore up resources due to the 
increased number of problem credit co-operatives (BaFin, 2002, 2003). Moreover, 
under the proposition that the relationship between bank characteristics and 
subsequent impairment is stable, the reported rise in the mean of the probabilities of 
being classified as problem bank in 2001 and 2002 suggests increased potential for 
exposure to systemic risk in Germany. This is of major concern as Upper and Worms 
(2002) present evidence that the collapse of a single institution can lead to the 
depletion of 15 percent of total assets of the German banking system due to 
contagious effects in the interbank market. However, it currently cannot be observed 
if the soundness has been deteriorating further as data for problem institutions for 
2003 and 2004 is as yet not available from the Auditor’s Chamber. Most recently, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2004b) reports that the condition of the co-operative and 
savings bank sector has improved.   
[FIGURE 1] 
Our inference based on Table 6 is confirmed by the plot for the trade off between 
Type I and Type II Errors over various critical levels presented in Figure 1. 
Classification results not better than chance would be represented by a diagonal line 
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from 100 percent Type I Error on the Y-axis to 100 percent Type II Error on the X-
axis. Thus, the concave shape of the three curves illustrates that the proposed model is 
of benefit for the early identification of ailing co-operatives and savings banks. While 
it could be expected that shortening the time span between the independent variables 
and the year 2002 increases the predictive power of our model, the plot suggests that 
this is not generally the case. Rather, the prediction based on variables for the year 
2000 (two years prior to the intervention by the protection schemes) performs at 
critical levels of up to 15 percent better than the forecast based on data for 2001. 
Overall, the three lines are closely aligned with each other. We therefore conclude that 
the model is very stable over the sampling period. As a consequence, authorities 
involved in the bank resolution and restructuring processes would benefit from taking 
advantage of this model as it effectively helps identify ailing institutions at an early 
stage and requires little maintenance over time.   
In summary, our model for the identification of problem banks in the German co-
operative and savings bank sector is based on a combined dataset that consists of both 
types of institutions. The findings from our validation exercise, in particular the 
results based on independent variables for the year 1999, compare favourably with 
previous studies of problem banks. The sharp decline of the potential for 
misclassifying impaired banks over time at the critical level of 10 percent is not 
surprising. The closer we get to the point of intervention by the protection schemes, 
the lower is the risk of making a Type I Error. Thus, this observation reflects 
deterioration in these institutions’ financial condition in the lead up to distress. The 
close movement of the trade offs between Type I and Type II Errors in the 
classification plot suggests a fairly stable relationship between characteristics of banks 
and subsequent distress over time. We moreover detect an increase in the mean of the 
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probabilities for being classified as a problem bank based on independent variables 
for the years 2000 and 2001. This suggests the presence of exogenous effects that 
adversely impact upon the business environment of financial institutions in Germany 
and increased exposure to systemic risk. However, the cross-sectional model setup 
deterred us from testing effects of such factors. In view of this, and given that the 
utilised dataset does not embrace the whole population of German financial 
institutions, we finally conclude that our results may still understate the actual 
condition of the financial system in Germany. The ability to track structural changes 
across the banking industry is an additional benefit of the proposed model as it 
provides initial information for macroprudential analysis.  
The findings for Germany confirm results of previous studies on other jurisdictions in 
that we also present evidence for the importance of excessive loan growth (X2), 
earnings strength (X5) and cost-efficiency (X6) for the identification of impaired 
institutions. The significant bearing of a variable that proxies liquidity (X7) on the 
classification of problem banks is a finding that has rarely surfaced in the literature. 
Albeit the Hausbank Financing Principle implies close ties between bank and 
borrower with close monitoring of the borrower’s creditworthiness, poor asset quality, 
reflected by the significance of loan loss provisions as proportion of total assets (X3), 
is found to have significant bearing on the probability for the identification as a 
problem institution. Our interaction term for management quality (X4) is also found to 
significantly improve the predictive power of the model. Interestingly, five of the 
statistically significant covariates bear strong resemblance to the CAMEL components 
(capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings performance and 
liquidity) frequently employed in previous studies of problem banks. This underscores 
the applicability of these indicators for the German banking system. Our observation 
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that banks in West Germany (X11) are less prone to experience difficulties has not yet 
been reported elsewhere. Likewise, the finding that the bank type matters (X12) is also 
new in the literature. The empirical evidence for the higher risk associated with co-
operative credit institutions is of significant bearing for bank managers and 
supervisors in Germany. Finally, we do not find that a high dependency on interest 
income increases the probability of future distress.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study empirically investigates the efficiency of leading indicators for the 
identification of distressed German co-operative and savings banks. Severe data 
limitations on German problem institutions have prevented analysis in the past. 
Drawing on an original database of 96 co-operative and savings banks that received 
support from the respective institution protection schemes during the period from 
1999 to 2002 and 519 sound institutions, we develop a parametric model that helps 
identify problem institutions up to three years prior to the surfacing of the difficulties. 
Our research suggests that the incorporation of variables that proxy bank type and 
location significantly augments the explanatory power of the proposed model.  
We present empirical evidence that a logit model using a dataset of publicly available 
financial statement information and institutional variables for co-operatives and 
savings banks is sufficient for predicting impairment. Based on our robustness test, a 
degree of classification accuracy is achieved that compares favourably with previous 
studies in the literature. These findings are important for the institution protection 
schemes operated by the Federal Association of Co-operative banks and by the 
German Savings Bank Association. Faced with a growing number of impaired 
institutions that pose challenges for regulators and supervisors alike, the respective 
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bodies are currently working towards developing early warning systems for the 
identification of problem banks. Whilst bank size is not discovered to be of 
significance for future distress, we report that loan growth, operating profit, cost 
efficiency and liquidity play a significant role in the identification of problem banks in 
Germany. Moreover, an interaction term as a proxy for management quality is 
important for the early identification of problem institutions. Despite the close 
relationships between banks and their borrowers, deteriorating asset quality is 
discovered to be a chief factor for subsequent banking problems. We also find that 
banks in West Germany are less likely to experience difficulties than financial 
institutions in the Neue Länder. Finally, we observe that savings banks are more 
resilient to financial difficulties than co-operative banks. In summary, the proposed 
leading indicators can help discriminate between sound and impaired financial 
institutions and thereby complement on-site inspections by bank auditors. 
The reliance on publicly available financial statement data makes our model 
dependent on the accuracy of the reported financial information by the institutions. As 
ailing banks’ propensity to disclose accurate financial information declines and due to 
the fact that our dataset does not embrace the whole population of financial 
institutions, we conclude that the reported results may underestimate the actual 
condition of the German financial system. Future research is therefore required to 
analyse the remaining pillar of private commercial banks and the potential for the 
exposure to systemic risk in Germany. In addition, a formal off-site surveillance 
framework that takes account of the macroeconomic setting appears necessary. 
Furthermore, the current practice of restructuring impaired institutions calls for 
extended research as to whether improved guidelines for prompt corrective action can 
be established.  
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Notes 
1  The Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, BAKred, (Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office), was the prime regulator for the banking industry until 
2002. The BAKred was merged with the respective regulators for the securities 
and insurance industry in May 2002 to form the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin, (Federal Financial Services Supervisory 
Agency), the prime regulator for the three areas of banking, securities and 
insurance supervision.   
2  This figure includes Landesbanken and the apex institutions of the co-operative 
credit institutions.  
3  Auditors are required by law to state the result of their annual review of 
accounts in a certification notation as laid out by Article 322 Section 1 of the 
German Commercial Code (2004). There exists no straightforward English 
equivalent for the German expressions “eingeschränkter Bestätigungsvermerk” 
or “ergänzter Bestätigungsvermerk”. We translate these terms as qualified or 
amended certification notation. The guidelines for the application of certification 
notations are laid out in Article 322 Section 2 of the German Commercial Code 
(2004). 
4  CAMEL stands for Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Quality, 
Earnings Performance and Liquidity. It is a commonly used tool by regulators to 
assess the financial condition of a financial institution during on-site 
examinations. The CAMEL score ranges from 1 (best) to 5 (worst), where banks 
with a score of 1 or 2 are deemed satisfactory. A score between 3 and 5 implies 
the necessity of increased supervision where scores of 3 and 4 point at close 
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monitoring by the regulator, whereas a composite score of 5 indicates a high 
probability of failure (Heffernan, 1996).  
5  The results for the analyses for each pillar can be obtained from the authors 
upon request. 
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Table 1 
Number of banks in Germany 
Bank Type 1998 % 2003 % ∆ % 
Savings Banksa 607 19.1 502 22.3 -17.3 
Co-operative Banks 2,253 70.7 1,396 61.9 -38.0 
Private Commercial Banks 323 10.2 356 15.8 10.2 
Total 3,183 100 2,254 100 -29.2 
Notes:  a includes 13 Landesbanken             Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2000, 2004a) 
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Table 2 
Sample composition by pillar 
 Savings Banks Co-operative Banks Total Number of 
Banks 
Initial Sample     
Sound 286 233 519 
Problem 15 81 96 
Number of Banks 301 314 615 
Training Samplea    
Sound 242 194 436 
Problem 8 56 64 
  Number of Banks 250 250 500 
Holdout Sample    
Sound 44 39 83 
Problem 6 11 17 
  Number of Banks 50 50 100 
Notes: a We run the estimation procedures for the training sample with 500 institutions as 15 problem 
banks had to be deleted from the initial sample due to data availability constraints regarding 
independent variables of six institutions and due to the fact that no problem date could be 
assigned to nine institutions. The 17 institutions that became problem banks in 2002 are held 
back for the holdout sample.  
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Table 3 
Univariate test for the equality of means between savings and co-operative banks 
Univariate test includes 250 co-operative and 250 savings banks. Calculations are based on variables as 
at year end 1998. The third and the fourth column report the means for the variables X1 – X10  for the 
respective group of institutions. The fifth column presents the t-ratios associated with the null hypothesis 
that the means for the respective variables X1 – X10  are equal between the two types of banks.    
Univariate Test of Equality of Means by bank 
type 
Xj Variable Description 
Co-operative 
Banks 
Savings  
Banks t-Ratio 
X1 Capital/total assets 4.9583 4.2998 7.5165*** 
X2 Loan growth 0.0853 0.0576 2.75318*** 
X3 Loan loss provisions/total assets 0.4101 0.3535 1.6786* 
X4 
Management Quality: Interaction term of 
X2 and X3 
0.0315 0.0182 1.8946* 
X5 Recurring Earning Power 1.0306 1.1033 -2.0373** 
X6 Cost-income ratio 71.9263 68.4508 3.9701*** 
X7 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short Term 
Funding 23.9303 30.9664 -6.8574*** 
X8 Due to banks/total assets 13.2945 19.9450 -10.8321*** 
X9 Interest income/total income 1224.0710 1481.1291 -2.1860** 
X10 Log of total assets  12.4464 13.9112 -18.5401*** 
Notes: The asterisks indicate whether the means of the variables of co-operatives and savings banks are 
statistically different from each other at the 90 (*), 95(**) or 99 (***) percent confidence levels.  
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Table 4 
Univariate test for the equality of means between sound and problem banks 
Univariate test includes 436 sound and 64 problem banks. Calculations are based on variables as at year 
end 1998. The third and the fourth column report the means for the variables X1 – X10  for the sound and 
the problem institutions. The fifth column presents the t-ratios associated with the null hypothesis that the 
means for the respective variables X1 – X10  are equal between the two groups of institutions.    
Univariate Test of Equality of Means by bank 
condition Xj Variable Description 
Sound Banks Problem Banks t-Ratio 
X1 Capital/total assets 4.5520 4.6081 -0.4075 
X2 Loan growth 0.0682 0.0822 -0.5498 
X3 Loan loss provisions/total assets 0.3412 0.6603 -3.8307*** 
X4 
Management Quality: Interaction term of 
X2 and X3 
0.0201 0.0570 -1.5150 
X5 Recurring Earning Power 1.1150 0.7313 5.3667*** 
X6 Cost-income ratio 68.8469 79.0767 -8.2329*** 
X7 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short Term 
Funding 28.1054 23.6147 2.8069*** 
X8 Due to banks/total assets 16.7640 16.2726 0.5541 
X9 Interest income/total income 1279.3798 1907.1114 -2.5642** 
X10 Log of total assets  13.2564 12.7879 4.1226*** 
Notes: The asterisks indicate whether the means of the variables of sound and problem banks are 
statistically significant from each other at the 95 (**) or 99 (***) percent confidence levels.  
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Table 5 
Empirical results for the parametric models 
Maximum likelihood estimation procedures for 500 institutions of which 64 received support from the 
respective institution protection schemes during the period 1999 – 2001. The results are based on 
independent variables as at 1998. Specification I utilises financial statement information (X1 – X10) only 
whereas Specification II additionally includes dummy variables that capture bank location (X11) and bank 
type (X12). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Xj 
Variable Description and 
Expected Sign of Coefficient Specification I Specification II 
  Constant -10.9097      (2.6898)     
-10.6698      
(2.2107) 
X1 (-) Capital/total assets 
0.0609       
(0.1927)      
-0.0454       
(0.1406) 
X2 (+) Loan growth 
0.0017**       
(0.0007)      
0.0012*      
(0.0007)      
X3 (+) Loan loss provisions/total assets 
3.7887***  
 (0.7035)      
3.0592***    
(0.7220)      
X4 (-) Management Quality: Interaction term of  X2 and X3 
-3.7895*** 
(0.7037)  
-3.0599*** 
(0.7222)     
X5 (-) Recurring Earning Power 
0.1332       
(0.2861)  
-0.1442*** 
(0.0304)     
X6 (+) Cost-income ratio 
0.1719*** 
(0.0246)  
0.1367*** 
(0.0245)      
X7 (-) 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short 
Term Funding 
-0.0405** 
(0.0184)     
-0.0530**     
 (0.0206)  
X8 (+) Due to banks/total assets 
0.0111   
(0.0266)       
0.0295 
 (0.0305)       
X9 (+) Interest income/total income 
-0.0008 
(0.0001)      
-0.0003 
 (0.0001)      
X10 (-) Log of total assets  
-0.03467* 
(0.1898)    
0.0650       
(0.1474)       
X11 (-) 
Location dummy: Unity if bank is 
located in West Germany or zero 
otherwise 
n/a -1.6892***   (0.5572)     
X12 (-) 
Bank type dummy: Unity if bank is a 
savings bank or zero otherwise n/a 
  -2.0044*** 
 (0.5813)     
  McFadden R2 0.3225  0.3818   
  Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 0.5624      0.5250 
Notes:  The asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 90 (*), 95 (**), or 99 (***) percent 
confidence levels. The McFadden R2 is defined as follows: 1 – (unrestricted log likelihood 
function/restricted log likelihood function). The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a model 
selection statistic whereby the model with the lowest value of the AIC is preferred. 
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Table 6 
Robustness test  
Holdout-sample results based on independent variables as at year end 1999, 2000 and 2001. The holdout 
sample comprises 100 co-operatives and savings banks of which 17 received support from the respective 
institution protection scheme in 2002. A Type I Error denotes incorrect classification of a problem bank 
as sound institution whereas a Type II Error constitutes the classification of a sound institution as 
problem bank. The figures reported in the very last row constitute the mean probability in the holdout 
sample for being classified as problem institution in 2002 based on independent variables as at 1999, 
2000, and 2001.   
 Robustness Test based on 1999 data 
Robustness Test based on 
2000 data 
Robustness Test based on 
2001 data 
Critical 
Level 
Type I 
Error in % 
Type II 
Error in % 
Type I 
Error in % 
Type II 
Error in % 
Type I 
Error in % 
Type II  
Error in % 
0.950 94 0 94 0 100 0 
0.900 94 0 94 1 100 0 
0.850 88 0 76 1 94 1 
0.800 81 1 71 1 94 5 
0.750 81 1 71 4 94 9 
0.700 81 1 71 5 75 11 
0.650 81 2 65 6 69 11 
0.600 81 2 65 6 69 12 
0.550 81 4 65 9 69 15 
0.500 81 7 65 12 63 18 
0.450 81 7 59 14 56 21 
0.400 81 7 53 17 56 21 
0.350 75 7 53 17 56 24 
0.300 75 10 47 21 44 28 
0.250 69 12 47 25 44 32 
0.200 63 14 29 27 38 37 
0.150 63 16 29 32 31 43 
0.100 56 16 29 42 25 48 
0.050 31 32 24 53 13 67 
0.010 13 64 12 91 13 93 
0.005 13 73 6 96 13 100 
0.001 6 94 6 100 n/a n/a 
< 0.001 0 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
 
Mean Probability for 
Classification as Problem  
Bank based on 1999 data 
Mean Probability for 
Classification as Problem  
Bank based on 2000 data 
Mean Probability for 
Classification as Problem  
Bank based on 2001 data 
 0.1144 0.2135 0.2610 
Notes: Equation for robustness tests:  
P(y=1) = -9.67832118 + 0.00129029 X2 + 3.07915620 X3 - 3.07983265 X4 - 0.09154643 X5 + 
0.13680952 X6 - 0.05564967 X7 - 1.69428003 X11 - 1.76224111X12 
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Figure 1  
Trade off between Type I and Type II Errors over different critical levels  
The plot illustrates the achieved trade off between Type I and Type II Errors using the results of our 
validation exercise based on 100 institutions of which 17 received support from the institution protection 
schemes in 2002. A diagonal line in the plot from 100 percent Type I Error on the Y-axis to 100 percent 
Type II Error on  the X-axis would  represent  results  that are not  better than chance. The arrows 
indicate the trade off for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the critical levels of 10 and 5 percent 
respectively. 
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